Justifying, Interpreting, and Other Pragmatic Issues

Abstract

In this paper I discuss an argument by Luis Robledo, according to which Rorty's notion of 'justification as consensus" is saddled with internal inconsistencies: it turns out -so the argument goes- that it is logically possible to conceive of a community that behaves as if p were justified, whereas p does not reach the justification standards of the very same community. Thus, starting from Rorty's own premises, we would be forced to acknowledge the legitimacy of an objective concept of justification, which Rorty seems to deny. I contend that this argument is misguided. I begin by noticing that the imaginary situation so described presupposes an external interpretative standpoint upon the practices of a given community. Next I show that, correctly understood, such an external standpoint is not incompatible with a pragmatist philosophy. Moreover, it precludes the legitimacy of an idea of objectivity akin to the one we find in Putnam's late writings, contrary to what the argument aimed to show.