Death in Spinoza’s Ethics: Different Views about a Problematic Notion

Abstract

The notion of death is not free of problems within Spinoza’s theory of Substance. If it is conceived as the destruction of the body, this definition complicates our conception of death. But if matter is perennial energy, as Spinoza thinks, is it possible to talk properly about annihilation? If it is said, instead, that death is the loss of the personal identity, we may ask ourselves what does identity mean, when literally read, Spinoza talks about just one real entity, the Substance. And if we consider one of the most curious doctrines of the philosopher, that there is something in the soul that does not perish with the body and is eternal, the notion of death opens metaphysical questions that seem to collide with others claims of the Ethics.I examine the framework of all these subjects and the doubts that they arise about certain central thesis of the Ethics.