Times, Objects and Events in Stoic Metaphysics
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Abstract
The paper tackles the early Stoic views on the individuation of times and argues that they allow for time without change. Different times may, in principle, be characterized by the same objects and events and, therefore, a differentiation in times does not necessarily require a differentiation in the objects and events that characterize them. The paper rebuts an important objection raised by Jonathan Barnes against the coherence of the early Stoic doctrine of everlasting recurrence.
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