Substance and Inherence in Aristotle's Categories
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Abstract
The combination and possible relations between the different types of entities present in the first Aristotelian essentialism govern the ontological economy in Categories by establishing priority and posteriority links among substances (I will refer to such vertical links as R1) on the basis of some criteria that Aristotle tries to clarify. However, the first Aristotelian essentialism is grounded on a distinction between essential and accidental properties, which might contribute to explain what an object is necessarily, and what features might it have or lack without compromising its identity. In this paper I offer a reconstruction of the transversal relation (R2) among substance and accidents as well as of the Aristotelian concept of accident and of some associated semantic features.
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