On What Is Apparent and Real: A Reply to Néstor L. Cordero and Jorge Mittelmann

Abstract

This is the reply to Cordero’s and Mittelmann’s objections to my book Apariencia y realidad en el pensamiento griego.. In my main reply to Cordero I show that, even in the Sophist, where the propositional aspect of knowledge is mostly emphasized, Plato himself suggests the idea of knowledge in the dispositionsal sense. I reply to Mittelmann’s objections that (i), even though Aristotle does not use the word “criterion”, this does not mean that he lacks the concept. In my reply to objection (ii) I suggest that, as is pointed out by the Aristotelian text on which my thesis is based (De insomniis 460b3–4), Aristotle is not considering the perception of proper sensibles, which is free of error or admits the least possible amount of error (De anima 428b18–19), but the perception in its transensorial sense.