The Role of Implicit Norms in Scientific Objectivity

Main Article Content

Natalia Carrillo

Abstract

In this work I argue for the importance of considering the role of implicit norms in practices within a notion of scientific objectivity. I begin by presenting the traditional notion of objectivity according to which science is objective insofar as it leads us to absolute representations of the world as it is “independent of our minds.” I then discuss the limitations of this view and introduce dialectical objectivity as an alternative. Dialectical objectivity is a matter of degree associated with the evolution of systems of commitments: a system is more objective the closer it is to reflective equilibrium. This alternative is promising; however, it leaves the role of implicit norms in practices uncertain. To strengthen it, I propose expanding the notion of reflective equilibrium to account for implicit norms and thereby better manage the biases associated with such norms.

Downloads

Download data is not yet available.

Article Details

How to Cite
Carrillo, N. (2025). The Role of Implicit Norms in Scientific Objectivity. DIÁNOIA, 70(94), e2089. https://doi.org/10.22201/iifs.18704913e.2025.94.2089
Section
Articles
PLUMX Metrics

References

Beisbart, Claus y Georg Brun, 2024, “Is There a Defensible Conception of Reflective Equilibrium?”, Synthese, vol. 203, no. 79. <https://doi.org/10.1007/s11229-024-04495-1> DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s11229-024-04495-1

Brandom, Robert, 1994, Making it Explicit. Reasoning, Representing, and Discursive Commitment, Harvard University Press, Massachusetts. [Hay versión en español: Hacerlo explícito. Razonamiento, representación y compromiso discursivo, trads. A. Ackermann Pilári y J. Rosselló, Herder Editorial, Barcelona, 2005.]

Carrillo, Natalia y Tarja Knuuttila, 2022, “Holistic Idealization: An Artifactual Standpoint”, Studies in the History and Philosophy of Science, vol. 91, pp. 49–59. <https://doi.org/10.1016/j.shpsa.2021.10.009> DOI: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.shpsa.2021.10.009

Chang, Hasok, 2011, “The Persistence of Epistemic Objects Through Scientific Change”, Erkenntnis, vol. 75, no. 3, pp. 413–429. <https://doi.org/10.1007/s10670-011-9340-9> DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s10670-011-9340-9

Daston, Lorraine y Peter Galison, 2007, Objectivity, Zone Books, Nueva York.

Elgin, Catherine, 2017, True Enough, MIT Press, Massachusetts. <https://doi.org/10.7551/mitpress/9780262036535.001.0001> DOI: https://doi.org/10.7551/mitpress/9780262036535.001.0001

Elgin, Catherine, 2010, “Keeping Things in Perspective”, Philosophical Studies, vol. 150, no. 3, pp. 439–447. <https://doi.org/10.1007/s11098-010-9547-7> DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s11098-010-9547-7

Elgin, Catherine, 2001, “What’s the Use?”, The Hedgehog Review, vol. 3, no. 3, pp. 9–25.

Elgin, Catherine, 1996, Considered Judgement, Princeton University Press, Nueva Jersey. <https://doi.org/10.1515/9781400822294> DOI: https://doi.org/10.1515/9781400822294

Esteban, José Miguel y Sergio F. Martínez (comps.), 2008, Normas y prácticas en la ciencia, UNAM-Instituto de Investigaciones Filosóficas, México.

Fagan, Melinda, B., 2010, “Social Construction Revisited: Epistemology and Scientific Practice”, Philosophy of Science, vol. 77, no. 1, pp. 92–116. <https://doi.org/10.1086/650210> DOI: https://doi.org/10.1086/650210

Fonseca Martínez, Miguel, 2024, “Practices and Normativity: Philosophy of Science, Agency and Epistemic Normativity”, Cuadernos de Filosofía Latinoamericana, vol. 45, no. 130, pp. 246–262. <https://doi.org/10.15332/25005375.9585> DOI: https://doi.org/10.15332/25005375.9585

Harding, Sandra, 2019, Objectivity and Diversity. Another Logic of Scientific Research, University of Chicago Press, Chicago. <https://doi.org/10.7208/chicago/9780226241531.001.0001 > DOI: https://doi.org/10.7208/chicago/9780226241531.001.0001

Longino, Helen, 1990, Science as Social Knowledge. Values and Objectivity in Scientific Inquiry, Princeton University Press, Nueva Jersey. DOI: https://doi.org/10.1515/9780691209753

Martínez, Sergio F., 2006, “The Heuristic Structure of Scientific Practices: A Non-Reductionistic Account of Practices as Heuristic Structures”, Chinese Studies in the Philosophy of Science, vol. 52, no. 2, pp. 1–23.

Martínez, Sergio F., 2001, “El papel de la historia y de las prácticas científicas en la educación”, Éndoxa: Series filosóficas, vol. 14, pp. 289–306. <https://doi.org/10.5944/endoxa.14.2001.5028> DOI: https://doi.org/10.5944/endoxa.14.2001.5028

Martínez, Sergio F., 1992, “Objetividad contextual y robustez”, Diánoia, vol. 38, no. 38, pp. 143–152. <https://doi.org/10.22201/iifs.18704913e.1992.38.589> DOI: https://doi.org/10.22201/iifs.18704913e.1992.38.589

Martínez, Sergio F. y Xiang Huang (comps.), 2015, Hacia una filosofía de la ciencia basada en prácticas, Bonilla Artigas Editores/UNAM-Instituto de Investigaciones Filosóficas, México.

Martínez, Sergio F. y Xiang Huang, 2011, “Hacia una normatividad basada en prácticas”, en Sergio F. Martínez, Xiang Huang y Godfrey Guillaumin (comps.), Historia, prácticas y estilos en la filosofía de la ciencia, UAM-Iztapalapa/Miguel Ángel Porrúa, México, pp. 5–63.

McDowell, John, 1998, Mind, Value and Reality, Harvard University Press, Massachusetts.

Megill, Allan, 1994, Rethinking Objectivity, Duke University Press, Durham, Carolina del Norte/Nueva York.

Nagel, Thomas, 1996, Una visión de ningún lugar, trad. J. Issa González, Fondo de Cultura Económica, México.

Putnam, Hilary, 1987, The Many Faces of Realism, Open Court, Illinois.

Proctor, Robert W. y John E. Capaldi, 2012, Psychology of Science: Implicit and Explicit Processes, Oxford University Press, Oxford. <https://doi.org/10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199753628.001.0001> DOI: https://doi.org/10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199753628.001.0001

Van Fraassen, Bas C., 1980, The Scientific Image, Oxford University Press, Oxford. <https://doi.org/10.1093/0198244274.001.0001> [Hay versión en español: La imagen científica, trad. S.F. Martínez, UNAM-Instituto de Investigaciones Filosóficas/Paidós, México, 1996.]

Williams, Bernard, 1978, Descartes. The Project of Pure Enquiry, Routlege, Nueva York. [Hay versión en español: Descartes. El proyecto de la investigación pura, trad. L. Benítez, UNAM-Instituto de Investigaciones Filosóficas, México, 1995.]