Induction as a Knowledge Method of Ethical Principles in Aristotle’sNicomachean Ethics

Abstract

 In this paper I reassess the role that induction (ἐπαγωγή) plays in obtaining the ethical principles. In my view, Aristotle holds in Ne A4 1095a30–1095b8 —a passage which has not been duly attended— that inductions consist in intellectual and cognitive processes by means of which we obtain the first ethical generalizations, i.e. the universal practical principles (διότι or the ‘why’), which in turn are obtained from the generalization of the particular data of practical experience, i.e. from the particular practical principles (ὅτι or the ‘that’). What we obtain by means of induction is of great relevance for the ethical science, since it is the starting point for the search of the ethical definitions. If induction is to be conceived this way, then, I conclude, habituation must be considered as an induction only by analogy