Pedro Stepanenko, A reply to the comments on Categorías y autoconciencia en Kant

Abstract

The author of Categorías y autoconciencia en Kant replies here to the remarks by I. Cabrera, E. Lazos and G. Leyva that are included in this volume. In response to the latter, the author characterises his interpretation of the Kantian deduction of categories as a reconstruction of a discussion between different positions, and expresses his distrust of a systematic reconstruction of all its parts. In response to Lazos, he analyses the different concepts of objectivity used by Kant in the transcendental deduction that lead to the problem of subjective representations. In his answer to Cabrera, he explains the sense in which the so-called subjective deduction can be seen as an analytic-regressive argument, and why the concept of self-consciousness as a self-ascription of representations is not useful in arguing for the necessity of categories.