The Matter of Abortion. A Legal-Philosophical View of an Ethical-Moral Problem

Abstract

 This article sets out to examine the legal-normative dimension of the abortion problem, considering the fact that an excessive emphasis on the ethical-moral dimension leads one into a pointless taking of positions. The dispassionate discussion of both abortion and its unavoidable public dimension is hindered by this taking of positions. Even though the author acknowledges his view as a moral one, he also asserts the possibility of regarding abortion as an action which can be linked to a “soft” legal model, where the moral view of legislation does not assume the features of the common moral view, but allows every individual to apply his/her own moral view. This leads us toward a legislation where abortion is neither an issue nor a legal duty nor a matter for prohibition: to abort or not to abort, according to this legal regulation model, is a decision made by individuals on the basis of their own beliefs.