The Formal Reconstruction of Dignaga's Theory of Reasoning. A Critical Review on Formalist Proposal

Abstract

The formalist approach to reasoning holds that the philosophical problems of human reasoning concern only its logical structure. Having reference to a case study of Dignaga's theory of reasoning, this article argues that such a formalist approach is unacceptable because the criteria for determining the correction of human reasoning often do not depend solely on its logical rules, but also on a series of factors that configure the practical contexts of its application. Dignaga's theory tries to model the correct applications of human reasoning in its practical contexts. If we reconstruct this theory only by means of some formal analyses of its logical structure, as most of historians of Indian logic have done, our neglect of these contextual factors will finally lead us to distorted and even paradoxical consequences, instead of a correct understanding of the nature of both Dignaga's theory and human reasoning.