The Notion of “Blind Variation” within the Scope of Scientific Change: A Defense

Abstract

Evolutionary epistemology considers that it is possible to account for conceptual change in science by means of a model of explanation similar to the Darwinian model of biological evolution. The last one has been traditionally built upon three principles: blind variation, transmission and selection. A central objection to this epistemological trend is that biological and epistemic development are not analogous because of the absence of any type of intentionality in biological evolution (blind variation), contrasting the presence of human intentionality in conceptual change due to science. A usual response is to postulate non intentional human processes in connection to this type of change. In this paper I offer a defense of the notion of “conceptual blind variation” by means of a clear characterization which, I consider, can be used within the scope of science and accounts for conceptual change, without the need to postulate any non intentional human processes.