Naturalism and Quietism
Main Article Content
Abstract
Brian Leiter divides the English-speaking philosophical world into quietists and naturalists. The former consider philosophy as a kind of therapy, dissolving philosophical problems rather than solving them. The latter can be divided, according to Huw Price, into object naturalists, who think that all there is is the world studied by science, and subject naturalists, who think that we humans are natural creatures and that philosophy has to adjust itself to this viewpoint. This paper argues for a quietist position about some problems in the so-called “core areas of philosophy”, as well as for a subject naturalism. From this dual perspective two current philosophical debates are examined: that between McDowell and Williamson regarding what it is possible to think of; and that between Fodor and Brandom, i.e., between a representationalist and an inferentialist semantics.
Downloads
Article Details
The author is required to sign a letter for the transferal of rights, and to authorize the distribution of his or her article through any format.
The reproduction of articles —but not of images—is permitted, provided the source is cited and the authors’ rights respected.
Creative Commons Atribución-NoComercial-SinDerivar 4.0 Internacional.