Metaphysical Conceptions of Analyticity

Abstract

This paper examines whether a notion of analyticity defined in semantical, logical or ontological terms would have the effect that analytic truths are somehow true in a less substantial way than other truths. Although the simple idea of truth in virtue of meaning is untenable, a notion of a meaning sufficient for truth can be defined. However, it does not follow that a truth with such a meaning is insubstantial, unless the necessity referred to in the definition is independently assumed to be insubstantial. Similarly, a Frege-analytic truth (one synonymous with a logical truth) need not be insubstantial, unless logical truths are independently assumed to be insubstantial. It is concluded that metaphysical accounts of analyticity give no support to the idea that there is a non-empty category of insubstantial analytic truths.