The Normativity of know-how: A defense of the framework of normative attitudes
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Abstract
This paper discusses the normative aspects of know-how. Our purpose is twofold. First, we critically examine certain approaches to know-how that, influenced by phenomenological and embodied cognition theories, employ what we call an “experientialist” vocabulary. We argue that this vocabulary fails to capture certain crucial aspects of the normativity of know-how: the agency it involves, the distinctive generality of normative interactions, and the adjustment of actions to social standards. Second, we recommend the vocabulary of normative attitudes in order to accommodate these aspects, and we underline the complementarity between this framework and the “situated normativity” approach. In a pragmatist vein, we defend that skillful agents establish normative relations with the world by evaluating it through their actions.
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