Aristotle and the Proof that Being Is Not a Genus (Metaphysics III 3)
Main Article Content
Abstract
In this paper, my aim is to investigate some features of the way in which Aristotle argues for his basic tenet that being is not a genus inMetaphysics III 3. The argument proves to be rather restricted, as it operates with premises specifying very special conditions for a good definition in accordance with the genus-plus-differentia pattern. It is argued then that this strong dependence on premises stemming from very specific philosophical schools accounts for its rather mitigated reception already in Antiquity, beginning with Alexander of Aphrodisias.
Downloads
Article Details
The author is required to sign a letter for the transferal of rights, and to authorize the distribution of his or her article through any format.
The reproduction of articles —but not of images—is permitted, provided the source is cited and the authors’ rights respected.
Creative Commons Atribución-NoComercial-SinDerivar 4.0 Internacional.