Virtues, Legal Argumentation, and Judicial Ethics
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Abstract
According to Manuel Atienza, a theory of legal reasoning should give an answer to the following three questions: how to analyze an argumentation, how to evaluate it, and how to argue. This conception of the theory of legal reasoning is, however, too restrictive. In addition to providing a sound answer to these questions, a theory of legal reasoning should also give us an answer to the question of which judicial virtues are necessary to make good arguments. A theory of legal reasoning is thus intimately linked to a theory of judicial ethics.
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