David Hume and the Speculative/Experimental Philosophy Distinction

Abstract

In the face of the repeated questionings that the distinction between empiricism and rationalism as a way to think about Early Modern philosophy has been subject to, new distinctions, such as that between speculative/experimental philosophy, have emerged. This latter is said to be more adequate than the former to portrait the way in which Modern philosophers worked. Our aim is to evaluate the worth of this distinction for Eighteenth-century experimental moral philosophy in general and particularly for Hume’s thought. We will show that if the distinction is understood exclusively, it is not adequate, because Hume himself states that philosophy is defined as a speculative discipline. Also, he proposes reconciliation between experimental practice and theoretical activity instead of considering that they are mutually exclusive. Finally, we will make clear that that what he calls and condemns as “false philosophy” is not a synonym for speculative philosophy.