The Fact of Reason as Self-Constitutive Activity. On the Foundation of the Kantian Morality

Abstract

In § 7 of the Critique of Practical Reason Kant presents his first definition of the universal law of morality—called the Categorical Imperative. In the same place, he affirms that being conscious of the law of morality is a Faktum of reason. The ambiguity of this statement has prompted some authors to argue that Kant does not deduce the moral law satisfactorily nor does he clarify how we become conscious of it. Nevertheless, they all forget in their analysis a relevant aspect of Kantian moral philosophy that turns out to be of great importance in contemporary studies of the philosophy of action —the self-constituting character of the rational subject and the role it plays within the foundation of morality. I claim that the Faktum of reason must be understood fundamentally as a self-constituting act.