La normatividad del saber-cómo: una defensa del marco de las actitudes normativas
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ste artículo discute los aspectos normativos del know-how. Nuestro propósito es doble. Primero, examinamos ciertos enfoques del saber-cómo que, influidos por teorías fenomenológicas y de la cognición encarnada, utilizan un vocabulario “experiencialista”. Argumentamos que este vocabulario no logra captar aspectos cruciales de la normatividad del saber-cómo: la agencia que involucra, la generalidad característica de las interacciones normativas y el ajuste entre las acciones y los estándares sociales. Segundo, recomendamos el vocabulario de las actitudes normativas para dar cuenta de estos aspectos y señalamos su complementariedad con el enfoque de la normatividad situada. Defendemos, con espíritu pragmatista, que los agentes competentes establecen relaciones normativas con el entorno al evaluarlo a través de sus acciones.
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