Ortiz-Millán and Duties to Oneself
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Abstract
In this note I argue against the very idea that it makes sense to talk about morality with respect to oneself, a view that Ortiz-Millán advocates. I hold that the motivation of anything one does for oneself is always prudential in character or based on self-interest considerations and that the moral dimension of human life always concerns “the other” and not oneself.
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Tomasini Bassols, A. (2008). Ortiz-Millán and Duties to Oneself. DIÁNOIA. Revista De Filosofía, 53(60), 167–174. https://doi.org/10.21898/dia.v53i60.290
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