volume LVIII, number 70, May 2013


Sobre la intencionalidad secundaria de las emociones

[On the Secondary Intentionality of Emotions]

Pilar Fernández Beites

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Abstract: This article outlines a phenomenological map of affectivity, based on the classification proposed by Scheler. Two faculties are distinguished: “affective perception” (Fühlen) —which is intentional and aims to values— and “emotional states” (Gefühlszustände) —which lack the strict intentionality of affective perception—. Classic emotions are included in emotional states and divided into two groups: “affective responses” and “mere emotions” (emotionale ‘Antwortsreaktionen’ and Affekte in Scheler’s terminology). Affective responses lack the strict intentionality of affective perception but possess a “secondary intentionality” which is “right” due to its adequacy to affective perception; in mere emotions the secondary intentionality is “unright” or even disappears.
Keywords: causality, motivation, understanding, personalistic attitude, naturalistic attitude

Demostración y silogismo en los Analíticos segundos. Reconstrucción y discusión

[Demonstration and Syllogism in Posterior Analytics. Reconstruction and Discussion]

Fabián Mié

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Abstract: This article focuses on the relation between syllogism and demonstration, as related to Aristotle’s concept of scientific knowledge in his Posterior Analytics. Three main lines of argumentation are followed: (i) reasons are given to reject that syllogistic systematization plays a unique role as a skill for justification and didactic proof of a body of knowledge previously acquired. Alternatively, (ii) it is showed that an Aristotelian explanation requires syllogistic as to the role of cause as middle syllogistic term. Thus, it should be feasible (iii) to sustain that it is not possible to firmly establish proper principles as explanative premises without constructing syllogisms.
Keywords: science, explanation, deduction, analysis, justification

Mecanismo y teleología en la Lógica de Hegel

[Mechanism and Teleology in Hegel’s Logic]

Edgar Maraguat

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Abstract: How should one understand the claim that “Teleology is the truth of Mechanism” advanced by Hegel in the Logic? It certainly opposes Kant’s position in denying the possibility that what seems to be teleological is only mechanical, but not in the sense of a dogmatic commitment to the reality of natural ends or in the sense of a refutation of mechanicism as in Fichte’s radicalization of transcendental philosophy. I examine in this paper which alternatives remain open once these are discarded.
Keywords: mechanicism, transcendental philosophy, natural ends, realism, speculation

Walter Benjamin y el proyecto (no realizado) de una tesis doctoral sobre el concepto de “tarea infinita” en la filosofía de la historia de Kant

[Walter Benjamin and the (Unfinished) Project of a Doctoral Thesis on the Concept of “Infinite Task” in Kant’s Philosophy of History]

Florencia Abadi

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Abstract: In this paper we investigate the reasons which led Benjamin to project his doctoral dissertation on the concept of “infinite task” in Kant’s philosophy of history, as well as the motives behind his subsequent abandonment of that project. We stress both the crucial influence of Hermann Cohen behind Benjamin’s expectations and the differences between their conceptions of messianism. Our aim is to show that the outlines remaining from Benjamin’s frustrated doctoral project contain the seeds of his lasting aspiration to lay the foundation of knowledge in a messianic conception of history. With this intention, we maintain, Benjamin interprets the notion on “infinite task” in connection with a demand of redemption that grounds the cognitive sphere.
Keywords: messianism, temporality, knowledge, Cohen, redemption

La venganza de Wilson. Una crítica a los enfoques seleccionistas analógicos de la evolución cultural

[Wilson’s Revenge. A Critique of Analogical Selectionist Accounts of Cultural Evolution]

Lorenzo Baravalle

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Abstract: The main purpose of this paper is criticize theoretical approaches —here called by analogy, or analogical— which aim to extract Darwinian concepts from a biological substrate to apply them to (partially) different ontological domains. This strategy is adopted by some versions of evolutionary epistemology and, especially, by memetics theory. An argument borrowed from philosophy of mind, namely, the argument of causal exclusion, is used to carry out the critique. The existence of a parallelism between memetics and mental causation will be shown, and it will be argued that any possible characterization of the first in terms of the second implies serious metaphysical and epistemological problems. In the conclusions, with no intention of completeness, some ideas on how to avoid reductionist positions, without taking an analogical posture, will be outlined.
Keywords: sociobiology, evolutionary epistemology, memetics, naturalism, causal exclusion