volume LII, number 58, May 2007


Concepciones metafísicas de la analiticidad

[Metaphysical Conceptions of Analyticity]

Timothy Williamson

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Abstract: This paper examines whether a notion of analyticity defined in semantical, logical or ontological terms would have the effect that analytic truths are somehow true in a less substantial way than other truths. Although the simple idea of truth in virtue of meaning is untenable, a notion of a meaning sufficient for truth can be defined. However, it does not follow that a truth with such a meaning is insubstantial, unless the necessity referred to in the definition is independently assumed to be insubstantial. Similarly, a Frege-analytic truth (one synonymous with a logical truth) need not be insubstantial, unless logical truths are independently assumed to be insubstantial. It is concluded that metaphysical accounts of analyticity give no support to the idea that there is a non-empty category of insubstantial analytic truths.
Keywords: truth, logic, meaning, necessity

El objeto puro en Meinong

[Meinongs Theory of Pure Object]

Víctor Velarde-Mayol

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Abstract: The notion of pure object, which is the object free of any being, is the fundamental piece of Meinong’s Theory of Objects. Thanks to this notion, it is possible to justify a coherent theory of predication where the subject can be constituted by fictitious objects, even impossible objects. Some analytic philosophers, without a good understanding of Meinong’s Theory of Objects, as in the case of Russell, have rejected the idea of impossible objects because it violates the principle of non-contradiction. On the contrary, the impossible object seems to be absolutely necessary in order to formulate the very principle of non-contradiction. An analysis of the position of the pure objects in relation to both the different states of an object and other objects of knowledge follows.
Keywords: representation, judgment, objective, intentionality

Davidson y la autoridad de la primera persona

[Davidson on First Person Authority]

Martin Francisco Fricke

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Abstract: In this paper, I reconstruct Davidson’s explanation of first person authority and criticize it in three main points: (1) The status of the theory is unclear, given that it is phenomenologically inadequate. (2) The theory explains only that part of the phenomenon of first person authority which is due to the fact that no two speakers speak exactly the same idiolect. But first person authority might be a more far-reaching phenomenon than this. (3) Davidson’s argument depends on the claim that “not getting one’s words wrong” is the same as “knowing what one’s words mean”. I argue that the two are not the same. In conclusion, I sketch some alternatives to Davidson’s account. I argue that the most promising one attempts to explain first person authority by examining how we acquire second-order beliefs. A well-known remark of Evans’s proves useful for such an account.
Keywords: radical interpretation, self-ascription, self-knowledge, Gareth Evans

La posibilidad de dar razones. Un acercamiento a la paradoja wittgensteiniana

[The Possibility of Giving Reasons. An Approach to the Wittgensteinian Paradox]

María Teresa Muñoz Sánchez

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Abstract: This paper sets out a reinterpretation of the so-called Wittgensteinian paradox that questions Kripke’s skeptical interpretation. The author retrieves those sections of the Philosophical Investigations where Wittgenstein criticizes ostensive definition as a criterion of meaning, and relates the idea of preeminence of meaning over reference to the possibility of giving reasons for the use of terms. Thus, by providing a revision of the connections between meaning and normativity, a reinterpretation of section 201 is advanced to the effect that Wittgenstein intended to dissolve the apparent paradox, rather than to offer a form of semantic skepticism.
Keywords: skepticism, rule, justification, meaning, reference

Ética y racionalidad práctica

[Ethics and Practical Rationality]

Luis Eduardo Hoyos

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Abstract: This paper is a defense of the thesis according to which there is a conceptual link, though not an obvious one, i.e. not an analytical link, between moral rationality and practical rationality. It is pointed out that this link could be seen when attention is paid to the normative component that belongs to the so called instrumental rationality, but also when it is acknowledged as convenient to build a bridge between the “eudemonist and utilitarian sources of normativity” and the kantian notion of a person as an end in itself. For persons must be essentially endowed with bodily predicates.
Keywords: normativity, rationality, ends, means, person