Diánoia

volume XLIX, number 53, November 2004



Articles

Justicia distributiva: medios y capacidades

[Distributive Justice: Means and Capabilities]

Gustavo Pereira

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Abstract: Dworkin’s equality of resources can be interpreted as a proposal that integrates distributive criteria taken from both equality of means and equality of capabilities, and overcomes the risks of subjectivism, overrigidity and perfectionism inherent in theories of welfare, means and capabilities respectively. This can be achieved by concentrating on arrangements of justice working within the parameter of equality of resources that equalize capabilities at a level of minima, thus avoiding the perfectionist risk and, once the threshold that ensures autonomous subjects is passed, ruled by criteria taken from theories of means. The condition of autonomous subject is ensured by means of a set of basic capabilities allowing for the overcoming of difficulties that other criteria for attributing responsibility have, when faced with the significant problem of adaptive preferences.
Keywords: justice, equality, autonomy, responsibility

Los enemigos y los efectos racionales del odio. Variaciones sobre temas de Plutarco

[Enemies and the Rational Effects of Hatred. Variations on Themes by Plutarch]

Gustavo Ortiz-Millán

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Abstract: In this paper I defend the idea that rather than disrupting rationality, certain emotions may actually help us to develop rational ways of thinking and acting. I make the case for the emotion of hatred, and more specifically to the case of hatred towards enemies. I argue that this kind of hatred may make us develop epistemic and practical forms of rationality. Hatred may generate rational ways of belief-formation by framing the parameters taken into account in perception and attention, and by bringing into light only a small portion of the epistemic information available. This emotion also narrows down the number of practical considerations that may help us to achieve our goals, while developing a strategic form of rationality—determined by the characteristic action tendencies of hatred. Finally, I argue that hatred may even have positive consequences in our moral conduct. These were topics originally developed by Plutarch in his Moralia, here I develop some variations.
Keywords: hatred, enemies, emotions, practical rationality, epistemic rationality

Del sentido de la genealogía

[On the Sense of Genealogy]

Óscar Martiarena

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Abstract: In “On the Sense of Genealogy”, from several texts of Ecce Homo, Thus Spoke Zarathustra, The Gay Science and On the Genealogy of Morals, Martiarena points out the sense, the aim that, in Nietzsche’s thought, has to make studies on moral history: to create freedom to new valuations. Also, the author held that in contemporary philosophy Michel Foucault’s work can be seen as genealogy of morals and that the French philosopher practiced and developed the idea of genealogy in the Nietzsche’s original sense.
Keywords: moral, history, Nietzsche, Foucault

La ética del “otro comienzo” de Martin Heidegger

[Martin Heidegger’s Ethics in the Other Beginning]

Luis César Santiesteban Baca

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Abstract: This article is about Heidegger’s ethics as can be gathered from his understanding of being. Its purpose is to elucidate the following points: 1) To account for the reasons that take Heidegger to refuse writing an ethics. 2) To show that even though Heidegger did not write an ethics, his thought does contain an ethical dimension. 3) To demonstrate how his ethical approach can be reconstructed under the notion of “originary ethics”, a term Heidegger coins in The Letter on Humanism and which refers to a conception prior to metaphysical ethics. 4) Since Heidegger considers the present ethos as dominated by nihilism, his thinking can be seen as an effort to contribute to the advent of a new sending of being (Seinsgeschick) which would bring about, in its turn, a new ethos, the ethos in the Other Beginning.
Keywords: metaphysical ethics, originary ethics, nihilism, attunement

La noción de “variación ciega” en el ámbito del cambio científico: una defensa

[The Notion of “Blind Variation” within the Scope of Scientific Change: A Defense]

Patricia King

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Abstract: Evolutionary epistemology considers that it is possible to account for conceptual change in science by means of a model of explanation similar to the Darwinian model of biological evolution. The last one has been traditionally built upon three principles: blind variation, transmission and selection. A central objection to this epistemological trend is that biological and epistemic development are not analogous because of the absence of any type of intentionality in biological evolution (blind variation), contrasting the presence of human intentionality in conceptual change due to science. A usual response is to postulate non intentional human processes in connection to this type of change. In this paper I offer a defense of the notion of “conceptual blind variation” by means of a clear characterization which, I consider, can be used within the scope of science and accounts for conceptual change, without the need to postulate any non intentional human processes.
Keywords: conceptual mutation, conceptual recombination, conceptual replication, conceptual modularity